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WILLIAM BUEL FRANKLIN 

February 27, 1823 
March 8, 1903 



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WILLIAM BUEL FRANKLIN 



[Reprinted from the Hartford Courant, March 9, 1903.] 

Major-General William Buel Franklin, U. S. V., one 
of Hartford's best known men, died yesterday morning 
at his home. No. 144 Washington street. He had been 
failing for several years and consequently his death was 
not unexpected. He began to sink Saturday afternoon, 
gradually lost consciousness during the night, and died 
at 7.45 A. M. without any suffering. Charles Weiser, a 
nephew, and Miss Emily M. Brace, were with him when 
he died. General Franklin leaves two brothers, Samuel 
Rhoades Franklin, rear-admiral of the United States 
Navy, retired, of Washington, D. C, and Colonel Walter 
Simonds Franklin of Baltimore, who served with dis- 
tinction in the Union Army in the Civil War, and was on 
the staff of General Sedgwick and was by his side when 
the latter was killed. Another nephew, William Weiser, 
by General Franklin's deceased sister, lives in York, Pa., 
and there are six other nephews and nieces, children of 
Colonel Franklin. 

Rev. George T. Linsley, rector of the Church of the 
Good Shepherd, made a brief announcement of General 
Franklin's death at the morning service yesterday, and 
spoke of the general's long connection with the church. 
Rev. Rockwell Harmon Potter, pastor of the Center 



Church, and a neighbor of General Franklin's, also re- 
ferred to his death in prayer at his church at the morning 
service. 

General Franklin's funeral will be attended at the 
Church of the Good Shepherd at 3.30 o'clock Wednesday 
afternoon. There will be prayers for the members of 
the family at General Franklin's late home, No. 144 
Washington street, at 2.30 o'clock, and the body will be 
taken to York, Pa., for interment on Thursday morning. 

General Franklin selected this city as his future home 
after his resignation from the army in 1866 and was 
chosen vice-president and general manager of Colt's Pat- 
ent Fire Arms Manufacturing Company, a position 
which he held until April, 1888. In 1886 he became 
president of the board of visitors of the United States 
Military Academy, and he was elected president of the 
commission which built the Capitol, in 1872, his record 
as an officer of engineers in the Mexican War peculiarly 
fitting him for the position. He was the consulting en- 
gineer of the commission from 1873 to 1877 and superin- 
tendent from 1877 to 1880. He was a member of the 
board of water commissioners of the city of Hartford 
from 1868 to 1878 and was chairman of the committee 
of judges on engineering and architecture at the Cen- 
tennial Exposition at Philadelphia in 1876. 

General Franklin was one of the presidential electors 
from this state who nominated Samuel J. Tilden as the 
democratic candidate for President, and from 1877 to 
1879 was adjutant-general on the staff of Governor Hub- 
bard. In July, 1880, he was chosen president of the 
board of managers of the National Home for Disabled 
Volunteer Soldiers, a position to which he gave the 



greater part of his time until about three years ago. In 
June, 1888, he was appointed commissioner-general from 
the United States to the International Exposition at Paris, 
and in the following year received the decoration as a 
grand officer of the French Legion of Honor, being the 
only American citizen at that time who held that dis- 
tinction. 

General Franklin was for several terms commander 
of the New York Commandery of the Loyal Legion 
of the United States, in which he always retained his 
membership. He was a member of the Society of the 
Cincinnati, the Sons of the American Revolution, the 
Army and Navy Club of Connecticut, and of Robert O. 
Tyler Post, No. 50, G. A. R., of which he was a charter 
member. The general was formerly a director in the 
Colt's Patent Fire Arms Manufacturing Company and 
was, until about a year ago, when he resigned, a director 
of the Panama Railroad Company. He was a director 
of the National Fire Insurance Company and until com- 
paratively recently attended the meetings of the board ; 
vice-president of the Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection 
& Insurance Company, and a director in the Connecticut 
Mutual Life Insurance Company. 

General Franklin was an Episcopalian in faith and a 
Democrat in politics. He became a member of the Church 
of the Good Shepherd when he came here to live and had 
frequently served in the positions of senior warden and 
vestryman. General Franklin was married on July 7, 
1852, to Miss Annie L, Clark of Washington, D. C. She 
died in this city July 17, 1900. They had no children, 
and the general failed perceptibly after her death. 



COLONEL GREENE'S SKETCH. 



A REVIEW OF THE CAREER OF THE GREAT 
COMMANDER. 

Brevet Major-General, late U. S. A. Major-General, U. S. V. 
Elected August i, 1866, resigned December 6, 1882; restored 
April 4, 1888, 1st class. Insignia 789. U. S. Army : 

Cadet, U. S. Military Academy, July i, 1839. 

Brevet Second Lieutenant, Corps of Topographical Engineers, 
U. S. Army, July i, 1843; Second Lieutenant, September 21, 
1846; First Lieutenant, March 3, 1853; Captain, July i, 1857. 

Colonel, I2th U. S. Infantry, May 14, 1861, resigned, March 
15, 1866. 

Brevet First Lieutenant, U. S. Army, February 23, 1847, " for 
gallant and meritorious conduct at the battle of Buena Vista, 
Mexico." 

Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, June 30, 1862, " for 
gallant and meritorious conduct in the battles before Richmond, 
Virginia." 

Brevet Major-General, U. S. Army, March 31, 1865, "for gal- 
lant and meritorious services in the field during the war." 

U. S. Volunteers : 

Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, May 17, 1861 ; Major- 
General, July 4, 1862 ; resigned, November 10, 1865. 

Survey of Northwestern Lakes. General Kearney's Expedi- 
tion to South Pass of Rocky Mountains. Assistant in Topo- 
graphical Bureau at Washington, D. C. Survey of Ossabaw 
Sound, Ga. Mexican War, battle of Buena Vista. Assistant 
Professor of Natural and Experimental Philosophy at Military 
Academy. Survey of Roanoke Inlet, N. C. In charge of Oswego 



(N. Y.) Harbor Improvements. Lighthouse Inspector, First 
District. Superintending Engineer of Portland (Me.) Custom 
House and Marine Hospital. Lighthouse Engineer, First and 
Second Districts. Engineer-Secretary of Lighthouse Board, 
Washington, D. C. Member of Board to construct bridge across 
the Mississippi at Rock Island, 111. Charge of Extension of 
Capitol and General Postoffice, Washington, D. C. Chief of 
Construction, Bureau of U. S. Treasury Department, and Treas- 
ury Building extension. Manassas Campaign ; battle of Bull 
Run, Va. In command of Alexandria, Va., and a division in the 
defenses of Washington, D. C. Peninsular Campaign; com- 
manded a division, and Sixth Corps, Army of the Potomac. 
Maryland and Antietam Campaign; Rappahannock Campaign; 
commanded Left Grand Division (First and Sixth Corps), Army 
of the Potomac. Department of the Gulf. Commanded troops 
in and about Baton Rouge, La. Expedition to Sabine Pass, Tex. 
Nineteenth Army Corps, and Western Louisiana. Red River 
Expedition. Captured, July ii, 1864; escaped, July 12, 1864. 
President of Board for Retiring Disabled Officers, at Wilmington, 
Del. 

Wounded, April 8, 1864, at Sabine Cross Roads, La. 

So Stands the bare record in the archives of the Loyal 
Legion of one of its most distinguished members, of one 
of the country's most gallant and competent soldiers, of 
one of her noblest sons ; a mere memorandum as it reads, 
but each item of which he, in the doing, filled with his 
own rare intelligence, accomplishment, integrity, bravery, 
and devotion, and made it a story of a worthy deed well 
done, and the whole a history of great services, in great 
exigencies. 

William Buel Franklin was born at York, Pa., Febru- 
ary 27, 1823. His father, Walter S. Franklin, was clerk 
of the House of Representatives in Congress ; his great- 
grandfather was a soldier of the Revolution, and his 



great-grandmother, Mary Rhoads, was the daughter of 
Samuel Rhoads, a Pennsylvania member of the first Con- 
tinental Congress. His mother was the daughter of Dr. 
William Buel of Litchfield, a descendant of Peter Buel of 
Windsor, Conn. All the heritable virtues of such stock 
met in this descendant. 

WEST POINT AND MEXICAN WAR. 

In 1839 he was appointed a cadet at the Military Acad- 
emy at West Point, where he graduated in 1843 at the 
head of his class and with unusual distinction. He was 
assigned to the Topographical Engineers, and entered at 
once upon the field work of that department on the lakes 
and in the Rocky Mountains ; after two years of this 
duty and a year in the topographical office at Washing- 
ton, he was made second lieutenant, having hitherto held 
only brevet rank, so small was the army organization and 
so slow the promotion. The Mexican War brought him 
the serious duties of topographical engineer on the staff 
of General Taylor, in the discharge of which he distin- 
guished himself, as he also did on the field of battle, 
being brevetted for gallantry at Buena Vista. For two 
years after the Mexican War he was assistant professor 
of natural and experimental philosophy at West Point. 
For the next two years he was engaged in the construc- 
tion of coast defense works ; then followed four years of 
constructive work for the lighthouse and customs ser- 
vices. In March, 1857, he was appointed secretary of 
the lighthouse board, and in October following he 
reached the grade of captain in the corps of topographical 
engineers. In November, 1859, he was charged with the 



10 

superintendence of the Capitol and postoffice buildings, 
and in March, 1861, he was assigned to duty as super- 
vising architect of the treasury department, 

CIVIL WAR. 

The outbreak of the Civil War laid such accomplish- 
ment as his under instant contribution, and on the 12th of 
May, 186 1, he was made colonel of the Twelfth United 
States Infantry, and on the 14th was appointed brigadier- 
general of volunteers. He was assigned to the command 
of a brigade in Heintzelman's division of the army under 
McDowell's command, which first came into collision 
with the enemy at Bull Run, which Sherman says was 
the best planned and worst fought battle of the war. 
Beauregard with his forces menaced Washington in 
front; Johnston at Winchester threatened its rear. Pat- 
terson was relied on to keep Johnston busy while Mc- 
Dowell dealt with Beauregard, whom he found in posi- 
tion at Manassas on the line of the Run. McDowell's 
plan of attack was to first demonstrate so strongly against 
the enemy's right as to lead to his concentration there, 
and then strike his weakened left with a heavy column 
from his own right which should turn his position and 
take it in the rear. Johnston had, however, eluded Pat- 
terson and added his force to Beauregard's just in time, 
and, by one of those curious coincidences not in- 
frequent in military operations and occurring sev- 
eral times in our Civil War, the two were preparing 
and had actually begun the movements for an attack by 
their right on McDowell's base at Centerville, which was 
in rear of his left as his lines were formed. Franklin's 
brigade had consisted of four regiments of short term 



II 

men. The term of enlistment of one Pennsylvania regi- 
ment expired at midnight before the battle, and they 
marched to the rear to the sound of the enemy's guns. 
Their gallant colonel, Hartranft, reported to Franklin 
and served as an aide during the day — a presage of his 
devoted service during the war. Franklin's brigade, with 
the famous Ricketts Battery attached, was a part of the 
turning column, and came upon the position on the Henry 
House plateau on the Sudley new road, which was the 
critical point in both the actions of the day. It was at 
this point McDowell's flanking force struck the Confed- 
erate left, and made an entirely successful attack, in which 
Franklin's command was heavily engaged at the center 
of things. As soon as this attack was well under way, 
McDowell ordered the troops in front of the Confederate 
center to attack with all vigor, which would at least have 
prevented any assistance being sent to the defeated left. 
But the attack was tardy and feeble, the only real fighting 
being done by Sherm.an's brigade, which crossed the Run 
and got to McDowell. But as soon as the heavy firing 
warned Beauregard and Johnston of what was going on, 
they had promptly abandoned the movement on Center- 
ville and sent their troops to the left, undelayed by the 
faint Federal attack on their center, and effected the 
changes of position which enabled them in the action of 
the afternoon to bring their combined weight to bear so 
unexpectedly and effectively on McDowell's right. The 
center of this later action also was at the Henry House, 
and Franklin's command bore its full part of the brunt 
of this as of the morning's battle and lost very heavily. 
The desperate fighting of his artillery by the gallant 
Ricketts was one of the brilliant features of the day. 



LcFC. 



12 



REORGANIZING. 



When the army fell back on Washington, Franklin 
rendered especially valuable services in the reorganiza- 
tion and preparations which followed, and was assigned 
to the command of a division in McDowell's Corps in the 
defense of Washington. An interesting incident of this 
long period of much necessary preparation and of much 
hesitation was a conference between President Lincoln 
and Generals Franklin, Meigs, and McDowell. The de- 
lays in action of the general-in-chief were followed by 
his illness, and, to be prepared for action in the contin- 
gency of his death, Mr. Lincoln called together Franklin 
and McDowell as among the most competent commanders 
and Meigs as quartermaster-general and a most compe- 
tent officer, and submitted to them a statement of the 
essential facts of the situation as known to him, the 
forces in hand, their positions, the state of public senti- 
ment, and the political conditions, and asked their judg- 
ment as to the plan of movement which could be most 
speedily undertaken and the time at which they could be 
prepared to move if ordered. The next day they sub- 
mitted a written recommendation embodying a plan 
which, unknown to them then and until long afterwards, 
Mr. Lincoln had already suggested to General McClellan 
and which had been by him set aside. 

PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 

During the winter of 1862 it was decided that Mc- 
Clellan should operate against Richmond by way of the 
Peninsula, his troops being moved by water to Fortress 
Monroe. From this point there were two lines of ap- 



13 

proach: the one by the James River (afterward taken by 
Grant, and preferred by McClellan, but then closed by 
Confederate gunboats and batteries), and the other by 
the York and Pamunkey Rivers as a line of supply. On 
the 6th of April he had landed on the Peninsula over 
102,000 men present for active duty. McDowell's Corps, 
in which Franklin had a division, was at Fredericksburg 
en route by land, but here it was halted to avoid uncover- 
ing Washington. At McClellan's urgent request, Frank- 
lin's division was put on transports and sent him, arriv- 
ing April 22, but it was left chafing on board until May 5, 
when, getting his orders at last, Franklin moved up to 
the mouth of the Pamunkey, and landing at Eltham, re- 
ceived a fierce attack by Longstreet's troops, where he 
was covering Johnston's left in his deliberate withdrawal 
from Yorktown to Richmond. This attack he repelled, 
and firmly established himself on the Confederate left, 
near the point which was to become the base of supply 
for the Army of the Potomac, whose movement up 
the Peninsula had been very gradual. On the 9th of 
May the Confederate ironclad Virginia, or Merrimac, had 
been destroyed by her commander, leaving the James 
open to the Federal Navy; but its line of advance was 
not available to McClellan, even if he still desired it, 
since the authorities at Washington would not hear to 
the uncovering of that city and required that McDowell's 
strong corps should, if McClellan were to have it at all, 
so move as to keep in its front, and connecting with Mc- 
Clellan, form his right to the north of Richmond and 
menacing the enemy's left. It was also necessary for 
McClellan to place his main force on the westerly or 
Richmond side of the Chickahominy, which was the only 



14 

considerable natural obstacle to his approach. This com- 
pelled him to advance along and astride the Chickahom- 
iny, with a strong force on its easterly side both to reach 
out toward McDowell and also to protect the base at 
White House. He now formed his troops into pro- 
visional corps, and Franklin was placed in command of 
the Sixth Corps on the i8th of May with Smith and 
Slocum as division commanders. The corps of Franklin 
and Porter formed McClellan's right on the northeasterly 
side of the Chickahominy, and after some fighting took 
positions reaching north of Richmond to await the ar- 
rival of McDowell, when they were expected to cross by 
bridges to the southwesterly side and join in the attack 
on that city. On the 24th of May McClellan was thus 
in position waiting for McDowell, without whom he did 
not consider himself strong enough to attack, and Mc- 
Dowell had been ordered to march from Fredericksburg 
on the 26th, and on that day he did march out eight use- 
less miles. 

AT FAIR OAKS. 

For Johnston was in command at Richmond, well un- 
derstanding the situation and the man he was dealing 
with. Jackson was in the upper part of the Shenandoah 
Valley with a strong force, and early in May he began 
to move. After a series of long marches and several 
engagements, on the 24th of May, just when McClellan's 
plans seemed at last going to his mind, Jackson appeared 
at Winchester; Washington was alarmed; McDowell's 
advance from Fredericksburg was countermanded, half 
his troops sent up to the valley to help catch Jackson, 
and thenceforth McClellan must get on without him. It 



15 

behooved him to fight Johnston before Jackson could 
come to his help. But only two of his five corps were on 
the fighting side of the Chickahominy, and only Bottom's 
bridge was available for crossing. By the 28th Sumner, 
who lay nearest the river and was the center of the army, 
had built two bridges for his command, but the two 
bridges prepared for Franklin and Porter, who were at 
Mechanicsville and Gaines' Mill, were not yet laid, and 
the army was divided by a treacherous stream, without 
crossing which it could not sustain such an attack as 
could be delivered, and in rear of its cut off right wing 
was its vast accumulation of supplies which must be pro- 
tected. Johnston considered that it behooved him to 
strike the left wing of McClellan's army while yet it was 
divided, and on the 30th of May his preparations were 
made. That night came the torrential rain which put the 
Chickahominy in flood and made its borders a morass. 
Early next morning Johnston attacked at Fair Oaks or 
Seven Pines, and pressed the Federal troops back, until 
Sumner, hearing the guns, without waiting for his or- 
ders, marched his columns to his bridges, which were 
kept in place in the torrent by the weight of the men, 
crossed, and struck the blow which saved the day and 
recovered the lost positions. Johnston was wounded, 
and Lee took his place, which he kept till Appomattox. 

GAINES' MILLS. 

And now came a month of delay in which McClellan 
seems to have halted between two opinions, calling, on 
the one hand, for more troops, and promising to cross 
the Chickahominy and attack as soon as the waters fell 



i6 

and the mud dried ; on the other, he meditated transfer- 
ring his army and supply Hne to the James; but nothing 
decisive was done until Lee settled the question. This 
great general planned to leave Magruder and Huger with 
about twenty-five thousand men between McClellan's 
left wing and Richmond while he took the rest of his 
force to the north side of the Chickahominy, called Jack- 
son to join him, and then swept down that bank of the 
river, crushing McClellan's right, and planting himself 
in his rear and on his line of supply. To deceive all con- 
cerned and keep any reinforcements to McClellan from 
the front of Washington, he ostentatiously sent a division 
from Richmond to Jackson, but at the same time order- 
ing him to move secretly and swiftly by interior lines to 
the proper point on the Federal right. He left Port Re- 
public on the 17th of June, and not a Federal officer 
knew of his march until on the 25th he reached Ashland, 
twelve miles from Richmond, the very day McClellan was 
advancing his pickets on the Williamsburg road. On the 
26th Lee struck Porter's Corps at Beaver Dam Creek. 
Porter held Longstreet in check, but Jackson turned his 
flank. And now McClellan decided to transfer Porter, 
as he had done Franklin, to the south side of the Chicka- 
hominy and his whole army to the James. But it was 
necessary to gain time to move guns and supplies, and for 
this Jackson must be held in check. Porter with his 
corps of twenty-seven thousand was assigned the task, 
and next morning the battle of Gaines' Mills began ; but 
it presently appeared that he had two-thirds of Lee's 
army pressing him, and Franklin sent Slocum's division 
of his corps to his aid. That day saw one of the bloodi- 
est battles of the war. During the day Franklin also sus- 



17 

tained and repulsed an attack on Smith's division at Gold- 
ing's farm. During the night the troops were crossed 
over, the bridges destroyed, and the march to the James 
began. The day before the battle of Gaines' Mills Frank- 
lin occupied the right of the Federal line on the Rich- 
mond side of the river, at Golding's farm. Besides send- 
ing Slocum to Porter's aid, when the latter fell back to 
the bridges, Franklin placed his artillery in position to 
command the opposite bank and used it with such effect 
that the enemy fell back to find another line of attack. 
The day following Gaines' Mills, the enemy made a 
furious assault on Franklin's right, where Hancock of 
Smith's division was posted, but was handsomely re- 
pulsed. 

On the 28th the retrograde movement began and 
Franklin was its rear guard. During the day he was 
again attacked by some Georgia regiments, many of 
whom were captured, among them Colonel — afterward 
Justice — Lamar. The day following, June 29th, Frank- 
lin ascertained that the enemy had repaired some of the 
bridges across the Chickahominy and was advancing in 
strong force on Savage's Station. Slocum's division, 
having suffered severely at Gaines' Mills, had been sent 
across White Oak Swamp. By some misunderstanding, 
Heintzelman's Corps had gone on, leaving a gap of a mile 
between Franklin and Sumner, neither of whom knew of 
its departure until the enemy began to appear where it 
should have been. Franklin promptly put his remaining 
division. Smith's, in position and notified Sumner, who 
formed for his support. At four in the afternoon the 
Confederates attacked and fought stubbornly until night 
fell, but were completely driven from the field. That 



i8 

night Franklin crossed the White Oak Swamp by the one 
road then known, and took position to prevent its passage 
by the Confederates. The next day, June 30, was a criti- 
cal one in this movement to change base. The trains 
were still on the way to Harrison's Landing, and the 
marching columns were converging on Malvern. 

Lee, perplexed at first, had discovered the true char- 
acter of McClellan's movement, and now sought to con- 
centrate his whole force on the latter's line of march, while 
it was yet in progress. Longstreet, Magruder, and Huger 
were sent hurrying south from Richmond by the several 
roads leading thence. Jackson was making for the pass 
of the White Oak Swamp. The natural meeting point 
of Lee's columns was at or near Glendale, in Franklin's 
rear and directly on McClellan's route. Could Long- 
street have established himself at Glendale or on the 
neighboring roads, he would have cut McClellan's line 
and compelled him to fight at great disadvantage, and 
would probably have compelled Franklin, placed between 
two fires, to let Jackson through. Could the latter have 
crossed the White Oak Swamp in force, he would have 
forced a junction with Longstreet and Magruder, and 
Lee's army would have been united and in a position to 
make trouble. And this was what he strenuously es- 
sayed to do. With nearly half the Confederate Army 
and a great number of guns, Jackson came to the cross- 
ing. With Smith's division of his own corps and Rich- 
ardson's division of Sumner's and Nagle's brigade, 
Franklin was ordered to defend it to the last, he having 
already put Slocum's division in position at Glendale, 
where it was heavily engaged in that most important 
action by which Longstreet was held in check until Frank- 



19 

Hn should be ready to fall back after seeing all the rest 
safe. Under screen of the forests lining the swamp, 
Jackson massed his troops and his artillery, and opened 
a heavy bombardment on Franklin's position ; but he 
could make no impression. As often as he tried to push 
across Franklin swept him back, and stood immovable 
throughout the day and until the last of his great rear 
guard work was done and the rest of the army was al- 
ready in its wisely chosen position at Malvern Hill, where 
it was necessary to give battle to the Confederates who 
had concentrated upon this point, both to give them the 
severe check which McClellan was now fully prepared 
to do, and also under its cover to allow the last of the 
trains to reach the new base on the James. To this po- 
sition Franklin now fell back by a short road General 
Smith had explored during the day, and took his station 
on the right, where he bore his part in the great battle 
that followed; the weight of which, however, fell on the 
center and left of McClellan's lines. And here ended 
the serious fighting on the Peninsula. 

While McClellan had been operating on the Penin- 
sula the troops disposed for the defense of Washington 
especially and in West Virginia were collected, and 
formed a second army under the command of General 
John Pope, who, at the time McClellan's troops were 
transferred from the Peninsula north, was fronting 
toward Richmond and toward the passes of the Shenan- 
doah with his base at Centerville. As McClellan's 
troops came north they were ordered to report at once to 
Pope, and became a part of his command. Early in July 
Franklin had been made a major-general, and in the re- 
organization of the Army of the Potomac he was as- 



20 

signed to the command of the Sixth Corps, with which 
he landed at Alexandria July 26, 1862. Pope was at 
this time making that confused series of movements 
which preceded the second battle of Bull Run, in his at- 
tempt to ascertain the precise whereabouts of Lee's 
forces, which were rapidly pushing north with Jackson 
in the valley, of whose whereabouts there was no doubt 
when he struck Pope's rear and line of supply at Manas- 
sas Junction. Hal leek ordered Franklin to camp and 
refit, expressing the opinion that no apprehension need 
be felt regarding Pope, and doubting if Franklin's Corps 
would be needed by him ; but on the 27th, parties of the 
enemy having appeared at Centerville, Franklin was or- 
dered to prepare with all haste for a forward movement, 
for which he required animals for his artillery and trains, 
and on the 29th he started with his entire corps for Cen- 
terville, soon meeting fugitives from Pope's command. 
With a correct apprehension of the possible developments 
of Pope's retrograde movement, he sent a brigade and 
battery under Colonel Torbert to take position at the in- 
tersection of the Little River and Warrenton pikes. He 
passed through Centerville, and three miles out he met 
Pope falling back, who ordered him to return to Center- 
ville, where he remained through the 30th, and from the 
time of meeting Pope was his rear guard until two days 
later his forces were in the defenses of Washington. On 
the night of the 30th Stuart with his cavalry made an at- 
tempt to strike Pope's trains in the neighborhood of Fair- 
fax Court House, destroy them, and plant himself be- 
tween Pope and Washington. But here he came upon 
the brigade and battery under Torbert, which Franklin 
had posted at the right point, and after a brisk night 



21 

fight was driven off, and an all-important position was 
saved and held. On the 2d of September Franklin with 
his corps re-entered Alexandria. 

Lee moved steadily northward, and on the 3d of Sep- 
tember crossed the Potomac, Jackson in the advance, 
near Leesburg. Pope had been relieved and McClellan 
placed in command, and on the 5th he started to locate 
Lee and bring him to stand and fight. He moved out 
from the defenses of Washington upon five parallel roads, 
covering both Washington and Baltimore and giving a 
front which was reasonably certain to touch Lee's line of 
march at some point. 

Franklin moved on the road nearest the Potomac, and 
his command constituted the left wing of McClellan's 
force. The latter fully believed that Lee intended to 
strike into Pennsylvania, but Halleck feared that his ad- 
vance in that direction was a mere ruse to draw Mc- 
Clellan far from Washington, and then, turning his left, 
slip in behind him. The movement, and especially that of 
Franklin's column, was much hampered in its progress 
by this apprehension. Lee was moving steadily north 
behind the screen of the range of South Mountain, toward 
which McClellan was cautiously advancing with a con- 
stant lookout to his left and rear. 

WINS Lincoln's thanks. 

The principal passes through this north and south 
range were Turner's Gap at the north and Crampton's 
at the south, both strong positions and strongly occupied. 
Reno's column was directed against Turner's Gap, which 
he carried after a severe and brilliant action. Franklin's 



22 

column was directed against Crampton's Gap, and about 
noon of September 14th his advance came upon the 
enemy strongly occupying a most advantageous position. 
He immediately made his dispositions and attacked in a 
most brilliant manner, and won the " completest victory 
gained up to that time by any part of the Army of the 
Potomac." A distinguishing feature of Frankhn as a 
commander was his broad grasp and thorough compre- 
hension of the nature and of the magnitude of the work 
he found before him, and then the unhesitating employ- 
ment of enough force, acting at once and together, to ac- 
complish his purpose. He studied his conditions care- 
fully and with profound military intelligence, calculated 
the necessary weight of his blow and delivered it in all 
its instant might. Perhaps nothing will convey a more 
complete illustration of the man in free and wholly re- 
sponsible action, of his soldierly qualities, his mental 
clearness, his modest reserve, and his lucid conciseness of 
style, than the following extract from his official report 
of this engagement: 

" The enemy was strongly posted on both sides of the 
road, which made a steep ascent through a narrow defile, 
wooded on both sides and offering great advantages of 
cover and position. Their advance was posted near the 
base of the mountain, in the rear of a stone wall, stretch- 
ing to the right of the road at a point where the ascent 
was gradual and for the most part over open fields. 
Eight guns had been stationed on the road and at points 
on the sides and summit of the mountain to the left of 
the pass. It was evident that the position could be car- 
ried only by an infantry attack. Accordingly, I directed 
Major-General Slocum to advance his division through 



23 

the village of Burkittsville and commence the attack 
upon the right. Wolcott's First Maryland Battery was 
stationed on the left and to the rear of the village, and 
maintained a steady fire on the positions of the enemy 
until they were assailed and carried by our troops. 
Smith's division was placed in reserve on the east side of 
the village, and held in readiness to cooperate with Gen- 
eral Slocum or support his attack as occasion might re- 
quire. Captain Ayres' Battery of this division was 
posted on a commanding ground to the left of the re- 
serves, and kept up an uninterrupted fire on the principal 
battery of the enemy until the latter was driven from its 
position. 

" The advance of General Slocum was made with ad- 
mirable steadiness through a well-directed fire from the 
batteries on the mountain, the brigade of Colonel Bartlett 
taking the lead, and followed at proper intervals by the 
brigades of General Newton and Colonel Torbert. Upon 
fully determining the enemy's position, the skirmishers 
were withdrawn and Colonel Bartlett became engaged 
along his entire line. He maintained his ground steadily 
under a severe fire for some time at a manifest disadvan- 
tage, until reenforced by two regiments of General New- 
ton's brigade upon his right, and the brigade of Colonel 
Torbert and the two remaining regiments of Newton's 
on his left. The line of battle thus formed, an immediate 
charge was ordered, and most gallantly executed. The 
men swept forward with a cheer, over the stone wall, dis- 
lodging the enemy, and pursuing him up the mountain- 
side to the crest of the hill and down the opposite slope. 
This single charge, sustained as it was over a great dis- 
tance, and on a rough ascent of unusual steepness, was 



24 

decisive. The enemy was driven in the utmost con- 
fusion from a position of strength and allowed no oppor- 
tunity for even an attempt to rally, until the pass was 
cleared and in the possession of our troops. 

" When the division under General Slocum first be- 
came actively engaged, I directed General Brooks' brig- 
ade, of Smith's division, to advance upon the left of the 
road and dislodge the enemy from the woods upon Slo- 
cum's flank. The movement was promptly and steadily 
made under a severe artillery fire. General Brooks oc- 
cupied the woods after a slight resistance, and then ad- 
vanced, simultaneously with General Slocum, rapidly and 
in good order, to the crest of the mountain. The victory 
was complete, and its achievement followed so rapidly 
upon the first attack that the enemy's reserves, although 
pushed forward at the double-quick, arrived but in time 
to participate in the flight and add confusion to the rout. 
Four hundred prisoners, from 17 different organizations, 
700 stand of arms, i piece of artillery, and 3 stand of 
colors were captured." 

Franklin fully earned the personal thanks so cordially 
given him a few days later by President Lincoln. Had 
Franklin's advance to this point been unhampered by the 
apprehensions of the authorities in respect to matters on 
his left and rear, he would have been in abundant time to 
relieve Harper's Ferry; but this was now out of the 
question. While he was breaking through to its relief 
it was surrendered. 

AT ANTIETAM. 

West of the wall of the South Mountain range An- 
tietam Creek runs southerly into the Potomac, and here 



25 

Lee was brought to a stand by the Federal successes at 
Crampton's and Turner's Gaps. Taking his defensive 
position on the west side of the creek, which was crossed 
in his front by four bridges, McClellan on the east side 
made his dispositions for attack, placing strong com- 
mands in position to cross at each of these bridges, Burn- 
side being at the lower bridge opposite Lee's right. The 
plan of battle involved Burnside's strong attack at that 
point, while Sumner and Hooker were to move up the 
stream and cross at the fifth bridge, above Lee's left, 
which was under Jackson. Sumner and Hooker executed 
the movement assigned them and came upon Jackson 
near the Dunker Church, and here the fight raged heavily 
and long. In spite of repeated and peremptory orders, 
Burnside did not attack for many hours, and so long was 
his movement delayed that Lee, becoming confident, 
moved a considerable force from his right, which Burn- 
side had not engaged, to his left under Jackson, so that 
at this point he was able to quite hold his own against 
Sumner and Hooker. Meanwhile Franklin, moving with 
great promptness and rapidity, had come up from below 
McClellan's left from Crampton's Gap, and was ordered 
to cross by the upper bridge and reinforce Sumner and 
Hooker. When he reached their position their troops 
were exhausted by their long struggle, had suffered 
heavy losses, were somewhat disorganized, and matters 
were at a standstill. Franklin sensed the situation and 
at once put his entire command in a better position on 
commanding ground, in formation for attack with his 
whole force, and placed his artillery where it most ef- 
fectually commanded Jackson's position. As Sumner 
ranked Franklin, and McClellan was not on that part of 



26 

the field, Franklin was necessarily under his orders, and 
when he reported that he was ready to advance, and ex- 
pressed his confidence of promptly and thoroughly rout- 
ing the enemy, Sumner, from the severity with which he 
had been made to suffer, had become so doubtful of the 
result of any attack that he forbade Franklin's advance. 
The latter at once sent to McClellan, stating his readiness 
to attack and his belief in its success, and urging Mc- 
Clellan to come in person and examine the situation for 
himself. McClellan came; but no urgency or assurance 
on Franklin's part availed to secure him the magnificent 
opportunity which he clearly saw, and which from his 
position and from the at least equal exhaustion of Jack- 
son's troops with that of Sumner's he felt certain must 
be successful, and he had the chagrin to be condemned 
to comparative inactivity during the remainder of the 
day, with victory, as he believed, at his hand. 

Meantime Burnside had finally gotten into action, and 
effected a lodgment opposite Lee's right on the west side 
of the stream, but after severe fighting he practically only 
held the position. His advances had been thrown back. 
Lee's troops from Harper's Ferry arrived. The next 
morning Franklin was urgent to be allowed to make his 
proposed attack, but McClellan was apprehensive that he 
was much outnumbered, and, hoping for a reinforcement 
of Pennsylvania militia next day, ordered Franklin to 
wait, promising that on the arrival of the expected rein- 
forcements he should make his attack. The troops did 
not arrive, but " next day " Lee had gone. It was never 
Franklin's fashion to send in his troops in driblets, and 
his plan here was to mass his forty guns on a command- 
ing ground, thoroughly sweep Jackson's position with 



27 

their sufficient fire, and then to deliver his blow with his 
whole force at once. Later knowledge fully justified 
his apprehension of the situation and the undoubted 
efficacy of the attack as he proposed to make it. When 
it was ascertained that Lee had retired, Franklin again 
urged that he be allowed to pursue with all vigor, as his 
troops were all in good condition; but here again he was 
overruled. 

Lee fell leisurely back across the river and moved 
southward. McClellan followed, and the two armies 
maneuvered for position until McClellan had his head- 
quarters at Warrenton with his army massed so as to 
threaten both the Shenandoah passes and the more east- 
erly lines to Richmond. Lee was uncertain of Mc- 
Clellan's design, and kept Jackson in strong force in the 
Shenandoah, while Longstreet was at Culpepper, his two 
wings being thus divided by long marches. McClellan's 
view was that Lee's army was the proper objective, and 
that its destruction or complete defeat was of far greater 
importance than the capture of even Richmond. Noth- 
ing could be sounder. It was the theory which, applied 
by the always ready fighting qualities of Grant and his 
generals, won the day at last. Richmond was important 
to them mainly because Lee had to care for its safety. 
McClellan was now in position to place himself between 
Lee's wings and strike each in turn with his whole force 
before it could be helped by the other, than which no 
better plan could be devised. But while preparing for 
this movement he was again relieved from the command 
of the Army of the Potomac, which was turned over to 
Burnside, who turned his back upon McClellan's line of 
action and began to consider what line of advance he 



28 

would take on Richmond. His views were not in favor 
at Washington, but he was allowed to take his way, and 
he began his movements for an advance by way of Fred- 
ericksburg. McClellan's plan ultimately included an ad- 
vance on Richmond after he should have delivered a 
crushing blow to Lee's army, either by way of Fred- 
ericksburg or by transfer again to the Peninsula, if 
the Fredericksburg line proved bad for supplies. Burn- 
side took command the 7th of November. For the pur- 
poses of his campaign, he organized the army into three 
grand divisions. The right grand division, under Sum- 
ner, marched to Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, 
where it arrived November 17th. There was but a slight 
force of the enemy posted near the town, and Sumner 
could easily have crossed and desired to do so. His 
orders did not contemplate it, and, on asking permission, 
he was ordered to remain on the north side of the river 
until all the troops were in their positions — an inaction 
of which Lee took the promptest advantage. Hooker 
commanded the center grand division, and moved to take 
position at Sumner's left. Franklin commanded the left 
grand division, composed of the First and Sixth Corps, 
commanded by Reynolds and W. F. Smith, and took 
position at Hooker's left below the town and opposite 
the heights, which, curving forward toward their right, 
end at the Massaponax. And here they waited for the 
pontoons to arrive for bridging the stream, which was 
now rising from recent rains. Presently Longstreet's 
Corps occupied the heights back of Fredericksburg and 
to the right, where he had abundant leisure to completely 
fortify chosen positions until they were no longer assail- 
able in front. Jackson was moved down to Longstreet's 



29 

right, and occupied the heights below the town to Massa- 
ponax River. After some consideration of a crossing 
at Skinker's Neck, some twelve miles below, Burnside 
gave up any idea of flanking Lee out of Fredericksburg, 
and determined to attack in front in the alleged belief 
that his attack would be unexpected, the enemy surprised 
and unprepared, and his positions readily carried — a 
view in which few competent soldiers concurred, 

FREDERICKSBURG.* 

On the loth of December Franklin was ordered to 
have his command at a point a mile and a half below 
Fredericksburg ready to begin crossing at daylight on 
the nth on the bridges to be already prepared. Smith's 
Sixth Corps, being the strongest, was to take the advance. 
The heads of his columns promptly reached the river 
before daylight; but only a few pontoons of each bridge 
had been placed. They were not finished until after noon. 
Smith's Corps was crossed rapidly, but, the bridges di- 
rectly opposite Fredericksburg for the crossing of Sum- 
ner's troops not having been completed, Franklin was 
ordered to draw back all of his force but one brigade to 
keep the bridge heads, and await the completion of the 
arrangements in front of the town. The last hope of a 
surprise was gone. What was to be gained now must 
be fought for against 78,000 men admirably posted in 

* The writer of this sketch has dealt in complete detail with 
FrankHn's part in this battle in a small volume: 

General William B. Franklin and the operations of the Left 
Wing at the Battle of Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862. With 
a map. 

Belknap & Warfield, Hartford, Conn., 1900. 



30 

strong and well fortified positions. On the 12th of De- 
cember Franklin crossed his entire force and disposed it 
most judiciously. He at once made a careful personal 
examination of his entire front, and he knew the im- 
possible work cut out for Sumner. Franklin soon per- 
ceived the one reasonable possibility of the situation, to 
wit: that the only chance of Burnside's success lay in 
such an attack on Lee's left and in Franklin's front as 
should break through and take him on the hills in his 
rear. Franklin had Jackson in front of him with 30,000 
or more men and good artillery. But if he could have 
his bridges properly cared for, so as to have free use of 
his force, he could prepare his attack with the fire of 80 
guns and launch his mighty blow with 40,000 men. It 
seemed the plain common sense of the situation if the 
battle must be delivered. Smith and Reynolds, than 
whom were no better corps commanders, wholly agreed 
with his view. At 5 o'clock that day Burnside rode with 
Franklin over his lines, and then, in the presence of 
Smith and Reynolds, Franklin carefully explained his 
plans and urged his attack as the one hope of success. 
He asked that two divisions from one of Hooker's corps, 
which were on the north side near his bridges, should be 
sent at once to relieve Smith in guarding the bridges, 
leaving him free to attack with his entire corps. Smith 
and Reynolds both fully understood that Burnside fully 
assented. Franklin meant to attack at daylight, and it 
was necessary that the additional troops asked should be 
crossed and placed as early as possible during the night, 
that his formations might be duly made. He was urgent 
for immediate orders. Burnside promised he should 
have them in two or three hours, as soon as he returned 



31 

to his headquarters, or at any rate before midnight, but 
forbade action until he had received them in writing. 
Franklin at once gave his necessary preparatory instruc- 
tions to Smith and Reynolds, notified Hooker's division 
of the orders they were about to receive and to be pre- 
pared to move, and then awaited his promised orders. 
But Burnside went to bed and wrote no orders till morn- 
ing. Franklin was " sleepless with anxiety " and sent 
repeated requests for his orders. No orders came, and at 
midnight he sent an aid to Burnside asking for his orders ; 
he was told they were in preparation and would be sent 
forthwith; other messages were sent, but none of them 
reached Burnside until morning, although their due re- 
ceipt at headquarters was properly acknowledged. At 
7.30 next morning Franklin received by the hand of 
General Hardie of Burnside's staff — not an order to put 
Stoneman at the bridges and in support and to hurl his 
whole force at a chosen point in front and go through, 
but : " Keep your whole command in position for a 
rapid movement down the old Richmond road; and you 
will send out at once a division at least, to pass below 
Smithfield, to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain 
Hamilton's on this side of the Massaponax, taking care 
to keep it well supported and its line of retreat open." 
Franklin was tied up. Smith's Corps was in line on his 
right and guarding the bridges, which it could not leave 
until relieved or Lee's center and left had retreated. He 
was to send one division to attack, support it, and keep 
its retreat assured, and yet hold his '' whole command in 
readiness for a rapid movement down the old Richmond 
road." There was no smashing of Lee's right in these 
directions. Franklin and both his corps commanders 



32 

could construe this order as directing nothing more than 
a reconnoissance in force, and in this General Hardie 
agreed. There was nothing for it but to leave Smith in 
his position, send a division out of Reynolds' Corps at his 
left to seize Hamilton's heights, support it, keep its way 
out open, and wait for that unknown event which was to 
require his rapid movement on the road; all of which is 
explicable only on the theory that Burnside believed or 
hoped that, instead of more than half Lee's army, Frank- 
lin had in front of him no force that would undertake to 
disturb him; that, therefore, after seizing Hamilton's 
heights with a division, his whole command would re- 
main disengaged and ready to move swiftly down the 
road. It would seem as if Burnside expected to rout 
Lee's left out of its position on the heights in rear of the 
town, and then have Franklin pass his right and fall upon 
his rear and his retreating troops, seizing a point mean- 
time which should put him in a position to make this 
rapid movement the more readily and speedily. 

Franklin's troops were necessarily in the extended 
order in which Burnside had found and left them the day 
before; the only order which was at once defensive and 
from which any formation could readily be made for at- 
tack or movement in any direction. The divisions of 
Stoneman's Corps of Hooker's grand division which he 
had asked to have ordered over the evening before to 
replace Smith's Corps, which was to be formed for the 
grand attack, were still on the north side of the river, 
and Smith could not leave his position without uncover- 
ing the bridges over against which lay the fiery Hood. 
Reynolds' corps was in line at Smith's left, and in his 
front were Jackson's divisions, and to his left and formed 



33 

across his flank was Stuart. Franklin promptly obeyed 
his orders. Meade's division of Reynolds' corps, being 
nearest the point indicated, was ordered to make the at- 
tack, supported by Gibbon's division on his right and 
Doubleday's on his left. At 7.40 General Hardie wired 
his chief that the enemy was advancing to attack the left. 
As Meade moved toward the heights where Jackson lay 
waiting in the woods, Stuart's artillery opened upon his 
left so severe an enfilading fire with eighteen guns that 
he had to halt until Doubleday deployed his division to 
the left, to face Stuart, silence his fire and prevent a 
threatened assault from that direction, both on the flank 
and on the bridges. Advancing again until near the 
slopes, Meade suddenly received the crossing fire of 
twenty-one guns on the heights on his right and five bat- 
teries on his left front. And now everyone understood 
that the woods in front were full of waiting infantry 
holding their fire for close range. Therefore the bat- 
teries must be silenced, the enemy's lines pounded with 
the guns, and reenforcements brought up to closely sup- 
port his thrust into the strong lines in front. Gibbon's 
division deployed for attack on Meade's right, Smith's 
left being advanced to connect; Birney and Stoneman, 
for whom Franklin had asked in vain the night before, 
were at last ordered over the river. After a severe artil- 
lery duel of an hour and a half, Franklin silenced the 
Confederate batteries, and Meade at once advanced in 
most gallant style, under a tremendous fire, broke the 
first line after desperate fighting, and would not be denied 
until they struck the second line and were being pressed 
on both flanks by the mass into which they had ploughed. 
Doubleday to the left was holding Stuart off, Gibbon to 
3 



^-- 



34 

the right had made a gallant attack, but was unable to 
advance as far, Smith's corps at his right was deployed 
against the enemy covering his entire front and pressing 
to find a weak spot to cut the army in two and destroy its 
bridges, the reenforcing troops from over the river were 
not yet up and available to take Meade's place and carry 
on the attack, and Meade had to fall back. And now the 
Confederates took the offensive and made a vigorous on- 
slaught, but were checked after stubborn fighting. 

Meade's attack and its results clearly demonstrated 
several things: the success he gained showed that had 
Franklin's plan of the day before been adopted and exe- 
cuted as planned, Stoneman's and Birney's divisions 
brought over the night before and so placed that Franklin 
could put both his corps in formation for a simultaneous 
attack prepared by his well-placed batteries, he would 
probably have broken and turned Lee's right. Accidents 
aside, this seems reasonably certain. The desperate fight- 
ing of the divisions employed, the failure of the attack as 
ordered by Burnside, and the number of the Confederate 
troops making the counter attack, and the stubborn fight- 
ing necessary to repel it, showed that no less an attack 
and in no other manner than that proposed by Franklin 
had a chance of success. The smashing of Lee's right 
of near half his army required something very different 
both in the dispositions of troops and the weight of attack 
from sending one division to seize a point if it could, keep- 
ing its line of retreat secure, and the " whole command " 
in readiness for a rapid movement on the road. And the 
ordering an attack by but one division, with instructions 
to support it and keep its line of retreat open, meant and 
could mean only one of two things ; that the man order- 



35 

ing it wanted a reconnoissance in force, to find a weak 
spot if he could, and then act according to circumstances; 
or else that he believed the enemy's line so weakly held 
that no greater force would be necessary; and it also 
indicated that in case the assault were unsuccessful he 
should not employ more of his forces at that point, but 
depend for results on operations elsewhere. Sumner, 
who was assaulting Fredericksburg directly in front, had 
been ordered to seize a similar position in his front by a 
similar force. The occupation of the one by Franklin 
and the other by Sumner Burnside hoped would " compel 
the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between these 
points." But the attack as he ordered it could have suc- 
ceeded only against a comparatively weak force. Cer- 
tainly the attack as he ordered it must have been a purely 
tentative operation, subordinate to and while waiting for 
other chief operations, to wit: the direct attack on Fred- 
ericksburg. 

General Hardie of Burnside's staff, who brought 
Franklin his order at 7.45 in the morning, remained on 
the field with him throughout the day, sending his chief 
frequent messages by wire completely descriptive of the 
situation, and getting no reply, no order or suggestion 
until the middle of the short winter afternoon. At 2.15 
p. M., he wired Burnside that Aleade and Gibbon had been 
driven back, that Jackson was attacking, that " things do 
not look well on Reynolds' front, still we'll have new 
troops in soon." At 2.25, while engaged all along his 
lines, Franklin received a message from Burnside saying: 
" Your instructions of this morning are so far modified 
as to require an advance upon the heights immediately 
in your front." What was the situation? Franklin, in 



36 

the extended order in which Burnside had left him the 
day before, and in such formation that he could have put 
his troops in column for the " rapid movement down the 
old Richmond road," had made the attack ordered and 
as ordered, which had been repulsed after long and hard 
fighting, and was now fully engaged in repelling a counter 
attack, 

burnside's course. 

Burnside had made his main great assault on the 
heights in rear of Fredericksburg and been utterly de- 
feated. Division upon division, under the most experi- 
enced and gallant soldiers of the army, had flung them- 
selves against that position with devoted bravery simply 
to be swept away. Just at the moment when Franklin's 
attack with Meade's division had failed and he was stop- 
ping Jackson's rush, the survivors of that fearful slaugh- 
ter had fallen back from their impossible task in utter ex- 
haustion. Any competent man would have known that 
what these men and their dead comrades, who lay so near 
the goal, could not do, could not be done. But Burnside 
was determined to repeat the trial. He ordered " Fight- 
ing Joe Hooker," commanding his center grand division, 
to take Butterfield's corps and carry the heights. He 
promptly formed for the attack, but when he saw the work 
before him, the difficult line of approach, and learned 
from Hancock and French the nature of the ground over 
which they had led their men that morning, he knew any 
attack was doomed. He sent a staff officer to Burnside 
to state his views and to ask a counter order. Burnside 
refused. And now Hooker did one of the bravest acts 
of his brave life : so sure was he of the useless slaughter, 



37 

he imperiled his reputation for courage by going in 
person to Burnside to dissuade him from the further at- 
tempt. His only reply was : " That height must be 
carried this evening." Hooker returned, and the scenes 
of the morning were repeated ; the same gallant assault, 
the same desperate struggle, the same annihilating fire 
from positions which could not be reached, until Hooker 
having, in his own words, lost " about as many men as 
he was ordered to sacrifice," drew back from the slopes 
where in a few hours had been lost seven thousand six 
hundred and twenty men. 

It was when Burnside ordered Hooker to the second 
assault that he sent Franklin the order at 2.25 to advance 
on the heights in his immediate front. Franklin's ex- 
perience of the morning had shown that no advance on 
his part could succeed unless made in the manner he had 
asked and been denied ; an effective advance required an 
entire new disposition of his troops and a proper formation 
of those told off for the attack ; but they were all engaged 
in fighting as they stood. If Burnside meant his order to 
initiate any such efifective attack as Franklin had planned 
the day before, it was too late by many hours. Such an 
attack required time and freedom from the pressure of 
the enemy to prepare. If he meant it for a general ad- 
vance of Franklin's line to exert a general pressure, he 
was already pressing against or being pressed by an out- 
numbering force strongly posted. Only ten minutes be- 
fore receiving this order General Hardie had wired his 
chief of Meade's and Gibbon's defeat and of Jackson's 
counter, and that " things do not look well on Reynolds' 
front." But on receipt of the new instruction he wired: 
" Dispatch received. Franklin will do his best. New 



38 

troops gone in — will report again soon." Franklin at 
once conferred with his corps commanders, and they were 
unanimous that under the conditions of time and the 
sharp pressure of the enemy no effective attack could be 
then organized, and that all that could be done was being 
done, and that their hands were full. At 3 p. m. Hardie 
wired : " Reynolds seems to be holding his own. Things 
look somewhat better." About the same time an aid 
came from Burnside saying Sumner was hard pressed 
on the right, and requesting Franklin to make a diversion 
in his favor if he could. Franklin replied that he would 
do his best. At 3.40 Hardie wired : " Gibbon's and 
Meade's divisions are badly used up, and I fear another 
advance on the enemy on our left cannot be made this 
afternoon. Doubleday's division will replace Meade's as 
soon as it can be collected, and if done in time of course 
another attack will be made. The enemy are in force on 
our left towards Hamilton's and are threatening the 
safety of that portion of our line. . . . Just as soon 
as the left is safe, our forces here will be prepared for a 
front attack, but it may be too late this afternoon. In- 
deed, we are engaged in front anyhow." At 4.30 he 
wired : " The enemy is still in force on our left and 
front. An attack on our batteries in front has been re- 
pulsed. A new attack has just opened on our left, but 
the left is safe, though it is too late to advance either to 
the left or front." At this moment Jackson had deter- 
mined to put in his whole force against Franklin in the 
hope of driving him back on his bridges, and had already 
put Stuart and D. H. Hill in motion against Doubleday, 
which was the new attack on the left referred to in Gen- 
eral Hardie's dispatch, and began advancing his artillery, 



39 

but the late hour and Franklin's heavy fire caused Jack- 
son to countermand his orders : " A wise determination," 
says the Count de Paris. And soon the night ended the 
day. FrankHn had lost 4,962 men, and had inflicted on 
Jackson a loss of 5,364. 

Franklin's plans, the orders under which he acted, his 
actions, and Burnside's constant knowledge of them have 
been given in so much detail because of what followed 
some weeks later, and also because they give a clear pic- 
ture of a great force, an important part of an army, set 
against a greater force of the enemy, with a commander 
who wholly understood his situation and also the con- 
trolling part of his force might and should have had in 
the whole day's work, who thoroughly planned the only 
possible and fully adequate attack, which he was not al- 
lowed to make, and, in executing the orders he received, 
was compelled to attempt with an inadequate force, a 
single division, the real substance of what he had planned 
to do with no less than six divisions, supported by at least 
two others, compelled to keep to his original extended 
line, and ready to move rapidly at any moment down the 
road. This man, who in his own way, properly sup- 
ported, could probably have broken Lee's right and sent 
him out of Fredericksburg, was made to stand ready for 
something else all day, and his real use was to prevent 
Lee from swinging his right around, and perhaps from 
sending troops from his right to Marye's heights had they 
been needed — as they were not. Longstreet's artillery 
and four brigades of his infantry sufficed to hold them 
against Sumner's and Hooker's grand divisions succes- 
sively. 

Shortly after the battle General Burnside said to Gen- 



40 

erals Smith and Reynolds, Franklin's corps commanders : 
"I made a mistake in my order to Franklin; I should 
have directed him to carry the hill at Hamilton's at all 
hazards." 

Burnside was still determined to carry Marye's 
heights and ordered an attack by the Ninth Corps on 
the same stone walls the next day, to be led by himself in 
person. But he was fortunately dissuaded by his grand 
division and corps commanders, and the army fell back.* 
Franklin recrossed his command on the night of the 15th. 
Burnside brought back to the north side of the river a de- 
feated and despondent army : men who had done the ut- 
most of human endeavor against impossible positions 
and seen life sacrificed to no reasonable purpose. He was 
not long in being made to feel the want of confidence in 
his ability to command which ran through from highest 
to lowest — the same want which he had felt in himself 
and avowed at the outset. He projected a movement to 
turn the Confederate left by crossing some seven miles 
below Fredericksburg, and had already sent a cavalry 
column to cut their communications, when the Washington 
authorities, advised of the distrust, which they doubtless 
appreciated if they did not share, ordered him to make 
no movement without advising the President. The raid 
was stopped and the scheme abandoned. Feeling the dis- 
trust on the one hand and the pressure of public demand 
for results, he resolved on another wager of battle, cross- 
ing at Bank's Ford, six miles above Fredericksburg, and 
taking it in rear. As all the fords were well watched 

* General Rush B. Hawkins seems to have been the first to 
openly oppose General Burnside's purpose. 



41 

and the ground open, secrecy was impossible, and to con- 
ceal his intended point of crossing he feinted on several 
both above and below. On the 19th of January, 1863, 
the grand divisions of Franklin and Sumner took posi- 
tion near Banks' Ford, the artillery was put in position, 
the pontoons brought up, Couch with his corps was sent 
to demonstrate below the town, and all was made ready 
for the attempt. But on the night of the 20th a furious 
storm came on, the physical conditions brought matters 
to a stand, Lee had not been deceived, and stood waiting 
in order on the other side. The army floundered back to 
its camp, and the " Mud Campaign " was over. 

And now it would seem as if, all hope of successful 
action in the near future being gone, the consciousness of 
distrust and the demoralization of the army made the 
position of the commanding general intolerable to him- 
self, and he resolved upon a step so extraordinary under 
the circumstances as to indicate a condition bordering on 
desperation. For six weeks he had accepted the respon- 
sibility for the ill-planned, ill-managed, desperate attack 
at Fredericksburg, and recognized the undoubted ability 
and faithfulness with which his subordinates had exe- 
cuted his orders, and the magnificent courage and steadi- 
ness of his troops in their repeated hopeless assaults. He 
had assured Franklin of his confidence and expressed his 
gratitude for his soldierly loyalty; he declared that he 
alone " had held up his hand " ; that he was going to 
resign the command and recommend Franklin as his suc- 
cessor. Suddenly all was changed. His first act on 
getting back to camp was to prepare an order dismissing 
from the army Generals Hooker, Brooks, Cochrane, and 
Newton, and relieving from their commands Generals 



42 

Franklin. W. F. Smith, Sturgis, Ferrero, and Colonel 
Taylor. He took this in person to the President and de- 
manded its approval or the acceptance of his resignation. 
He made no charge of incompetency or disobedience or 
failure in duty, but only of a lack of confidence in him- 
self: a reason which would have dismissed or relieved 
pretty much all the officers of the Army of the Potomac. 
His resignation was accepted, and Hooker, whose name 
led the list of dismissals, was put in his stead; but as he 
was junior in rank of Franklin, the latter was as a matter 
of course relieved from his command. 

The day after the Mud Campaign ended. General 
Franklin and his close friend, and one of his corps com- 
manders. General W. F. Smith ("Baldy"), addressed 
a most interesting letter to the President, pointing out in 
the clearest manner the great difficulties of the plan of 
advance on the Fredericksburg line, the great length of 
the route, the great numbers of troops required for its 
protection, its vulnerability at every point, the scattering 
of forces for guarding the enormous trains should the 
line be abandoned as the army advanced, carrying all its 
supplies with it ; then the essentials of a successful ad- 
vance : 

" I. All the troops available in the east should be 
massed. 

" 2. They should approach as near to Richmond as 
possible without engagement. 

" 3. The line of communication should be absolutely 
free from danger of interruption. 

" A campaign on the James River enables us to fulfill 
all these conditions more absolutely than any other, for: 

" I. On the James River our troops from both north 



43 

and south can be concentrated more rapidly than they 
can be at any other point. 

" 2. They can be brought to points within twenty 
miles of Richmond without risk of an engagement. 

" 3. The communication by the James River can be 
kept up by the assistance of the navy without the slightest 
danger of interruption." 

Then follows the outline scheme of details, all with an 
equal clearness, comprehensiveness, and simplicity. 

It is refreshing to find amid all the confusion of mind 
and method of those days a piece of work so thorough, 
so sound, so completely thought out. It is a study by a 
master not only of theory but of practice. 

And now befell General Franklin one of those cruel- 
ties born of many motives, weaknesses, afterthoughts, 
prejudices, partialities, personal and political, from which 
such times are never free. 

The congressional committee on the conduct of the 
war appeared to investigate the causes of the defeat at 
Fredericksburg, summoning before them General Burn- 
side and many of his officers. 

Six days after the battle Burnside had written Hal- 
leck a description of his plan of the action as it was 
fought: " I discovered that he (the enemy) did not an- 
ticipate the crossing of our whole force at Fredericks- 
burg, and I hoped, by rapidly throwing the whole com- 
mand over at that place to separate, by a vigorous 
attack, the forces of the enemy on the river below from 
the forces behind and on the crest in the rear of the town, 
in which case we could fight him with great advantage in 
our favor. For this we had to gain a height on the ex- 
treme right of the crest which commanded a new road 



44 

lately made by the enemy." This " height on the ex- 
treme right of the crest " was Marye's heights, which 
were exceedingly difficult of approach and had been made 
impregnable. They were separated from the line of 
heights below the town by Hazel Run ; these latter heights 
were occupied by Longstreet's men as far as Deep Run, 
below which and down to the Massaponax Jackson's di- 
visions were massed, with Stuart formed across the left 
of Franklin's line of battle. The plan given General 
Halleck by Burnside is the plan on which the battle was 
fought, and it accounts for his order of 7.30 a. m. to 
Franklin as a subordinate feature of the plan. In order 
to divide the enemy's troops on the crest in rear of the 
town from those on the hills below, he delivers a tre- 
mendous assault on Marye's heights, and orders Franklin 
to send one division to seize Hamilton's heights at the 
extreme left of these heights, in the hope that the seizure 
of these two points would " compel the enemy to evacuate 
the whole ridge between these two points." It was in 
view of this hoped for contingency doubtless that he or- 
dered Franklin to keep his entire command in readiness 
for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road, 
which would have brought him on the rear of the dis- 
lodged enemy. The two series of heavy assaults on 
Marye's heights failed disastrously. The division sent 
to seize Hamilton's heights was met with overwhelming 
force, while the rest of Franklin's divisions were held in 
place aHke by the constant pressure of the enemy and by 
his orders to have all in readiness for a rapid movement 
down the road. 

But to the Committee on the Conduct of the War 
General Burnside said : " The enemy had cut a road 



45 

along in the rear of the Hne of heights where we made 
our attack, by means of which they connected the two 
wings of their army and avoided a long detour around 
through a bad country. ... I wanted to obtain pos- 
session of that new road, and that was my reason for 
making an attack on the extreme left. I did not intend 
to make the attack on the right until that position had 
been taken, which I supposed would stagger the enemy, 
cutting their line in two ; and then I proposed to make a 
direct attack on their front and drive them out of their 
works." General Palfrey well says of this statement: 
" It cannot be true." 

From 7.30 in the morning until night fell, General 
Burnside knew constantly from his own staff officer, who 
carried the order to and remained all day with Franklin, 
observing and reporting every act done by him, every- 
thing going on in that part of the field. If he did not 
mean to attack on the right until Hamilton's heights were 
carried, why did he attack? If he meant to cut the en- 
emy's line in two and stagger him before trying Marye's 
heights, why did he not allow Franklin to do precisely 
that thing which he had begged to be allowed to do : mass 
his own men for the assault, supported by Stoneman's 
divisions and Hancock, and deliver the blow which 
Meade's attack showed would have gone through so 
delivered ? 

But the letter to General Halleck was not shown to 
the committee, nor known to them until long after. 

When Franklin was summoned before them he asked 
Burnside if they were aware of his order of 7.30 a. m. 
of the 13th, or if he should give them a copy. Burnside 
replied that he had already given them a copy of that 



46 

order and it was then in their hands. Franklin relied, as 
he had a right, on the word of his commander and of the 
man who had assured him that he was only one of all his 
generals who had held up his hands ; and he was be- 
trayed. The committee never heard of the order until 
months afterward. Between the new plan of the battle, 
which none but the committee had ever heard of and the 
success of which was made to hinge on Franklin's attack, 
and the suppression of the orders under which he acted, 
he was in an utterly false light and false position before 
the committee, and he was in complete ignorance of the 
mischief and how it had been wrought. He became con- 
scious of a great prejudice, but was unable to fathom it 
or its cause. The committee refused to hear some of his 
witnesses. General Hardie among them. He was not 
confronted with Burnside's statements. But the commit- 
tee published to the world their verdict that Franklin 
was responsible for the loss of the battle through dis- 
obedience of orders. 

This most undeserved blow could have fallen on no 
man more sensitive to its fullest import. To use his own 
words : " If this be true, I have been guilty of the high- 
est crime known to military law, for the commission of 
which my life is forfeit and my name consigned to in- 
famy." 

And so, without a trial, without that responsible judg- 
ment of his companions in arms and his peers to which 
every man charged with military default is entitled, this 
man of oft tried ability and proven strength, to whom 
honor and loyalty were the breath of his life, and upon 
whom every superior had relied as on a rock, stood 
charged by an irresponsible, Star-Chamber Committee, 



47 

" of the highest crime known to military law." No court- 
martial was ever even suggested. To all men who knew 
men and facts the charge was preposterous. 

Franklin at once published a reply to the Committee's 
Report, which was a complete refutation, and by which 
they were first made aware both of the real plan on which 
the battle was fought and which Burnside had already 
given in his letter to Halleck, and also of the order under 
which Franklin acted during the day. Not until the com- 
mittee had received his reply quoting that order was 
Franklin aware that they had never before seen it. Not 
until a second edition of the reply was published with 
additional notes and correspondence was the full iniquity 
of the matter made clear. 

His reply and the correspondence which followed fully 
cleared his record with the War Department and left the 
responsibility where it belonged. But the poison of the 
committee's charge, caught up and exploited by the press 
with a public eager to fix final blame somewhere, wrought 
him great prejudice, and Hay, in his life of Lincoln, says: 
" Franklin's undoubted talents never again had an op- 
portunity for exercise in a field worthy of them." His 
great talents, his professional skill, his judgment, his 
courage, his methods, his services, and his rank pointed 
to him as the proper commander of the Army of the 
Potomac. But the cloud overshadowed him. Smarting 
under the great wrong and " in perfect darkness of soul," 
Franklin asked for any assignment whereby he might in 
some way serve his country. And in July he was sent to 
New Orleans to take command of the Nineteenth Corps, 
which had formed a part of Banks' command at Port 
Hudson. 



48 



WITH BANKS. 

After Grant captured Vicksburg he purposed to use 
his entire army at once for the capture of Mobile, using 
that point as a base for new operations on the heart of 
the enemy's country, and began his arrangements accord- 
ingly, a part of which was the concentration of an army 
at New Orleans. But Halleck, who was still general-in- 
chief, sent away a strong force under Steele to Little 
Rock, and set a new task for the New Orleans contingent. 
Maximilian, supported by a French army, was emperor 
of Mexico, and it was deemed necessary to cut off Con- 
federate traffic in supplies across the border and keep 
watch over the newcomers. These operations were in 
charge of General Banks, who decided on Sabine Pass 
as his advanced base. This point was occupied and forti- 
fied by the Confederates. Franklin was ordered to pro- 
ceed thither with 5,000 men on transports, escorted by 
four gunboats, which were to reduce the batteries and 
prepare the landing. The outfit of the expedition was 
miserably unfit and inadequate, but no time was allowed 
to remedy deficiencies to provide necessities. The trans- 
ports carrying the troops arrived outside the bar, the 
gunboats entered the channel and engaged the batteries 
with disastrous results. Two of the vessels were imme- 
diately disabled and surrendered, the third ran aground, 
and the fourth and last put to sea, returning, however, 
to convey the transports back to New Orleans, where 
they arrived September nth. 

The next day Franklin, with the Nineteenth and two 
divisions of the Thirteenth Corps, took up his march to 
ascertain if it was practicable to reach the Sabine River 



49 

on a line parallel to the coast. He skirmished his way to 
Vermillionville when Banks abandoned further attempt 
on that line. Here he made demonstrations in aid of the 
naval expedition sent by Banks to the western coast, and, 
on the success of the latter, moved to New Iberia. Sev- 
eral engagements took place, but the enemy avoided seri- 
ous conclusions. And now came the Red River expedi- 
tion. 

Kirby Smith, with the troops of Price and Taylor, 
occupied the Red River valley, with headquarters near 
Shreveport. Halleck was determined to rout him out of 
the valley and take possession. To which end he designed 
to send Banks against him on the south while Steele sup- 
ported him from the valley of the Arkansas on the 
north. But it took at least two weeks for these widely 
separated commanders to communicate. At this junc- 
ture, the winter weather having put a stop to Grant's 
operations, Sherman lent Banks 10,000 men under A. J. 
Smith for a month, escorted by the best part of Porter's 
fleet and Ellet's Marine Brigade, to report to Alex- 
andria, which was the rendezvous, March i6th. Frank- 
lin was in command of the troops of Banks' army proper, 
and Banks commanded the joint forces. Steele was ex- 
pected to proceed down the Washita until within com- 
municating distance. The troops of Franklin and Smith 
were to proceed on roads parallel with and near the river, 
accompanied by the fleet. On the 27th of March they 
set forth with Franklin in the advance. On the 31st of 
March his cavalry occupied Natchitoches, the enemy re- 
tiring, and two days later his infantry arrived. Here, 
in order to give his columns better roads, Banks diverged 
so far from the river as to be entirely out of touch with 
4 



50 

the fleet and without its invaluable support. In place of 
supplies from the transports, he had to organize a large 
wagon train, and to weaken his forces by detaching a 
division to guard the fleet, whose progress up the narrow 
and shoaling river was becoming more difficult. The 
route chosen led through Pleasant Hill, a strong position 
with good water, where the enemy was in some force, to 
Sabine Cross Roads and Mansfield, a point commanding 
several important routes and where Taylor was concen- 
trating. While awaiting the supply trains, Franklin's 
cavalry reconnoitered the roads and by several spirited 
skirmishes located the enemy. On the 6th of April 
Franklin resumed his march to Pleasant Hill, where his 
cavalry had taken position. On the 7th his cavalry under 
Lee advanced, fighting steadily and pressing back a bri- 
gade of Taylor's cavalry, until at a branch of the Bayou 
St. Patrice he was brought to a stand by the entire cavalry 
force of the enemy under Green. The same day Frank- 
lin reached Pleasant Hill and made his dispositions for 
an advance with a brigade of cavalry in front to clear the 
way until the main body of the enemy was reached. 
Banks joined him during the day and overruled his dis- 
positions, and ordered a combination advance guard of 
cavalry, infantry, and artillery, which, with their large 
trains, made, as events proved, an awkward force to 
handle. 

SABINE CROSS ROADS. 

Taylor decided to make the fight at Sabine Cross 
Roads, three miles from Mansfield, and made his dis- 
positions. On the morning of the 8th the advance guard 



51 

moved slowly forward. Franklin followed with his ad- 
vance division to the Bayou St, Patrice and halted to 
allow his columns to close up and concentrate. Banks 
joined the advance guard, and soon sent back for another 
brigade of infantry. Franklin sent the division com- 
mander, Ransom, with it, with orders not to allow both 
brigades to become engaged ; his purpose being to keep 
in touch only with the enemy until Emory's division could 
close up and A. J. Smith's ten thousand should have come 
in supporting distance, a matter of some time with so 
large a body in column on a single road. But Banks was 
at the front and assumed the command, and, forgetful of 
the conditions in rear, determined to push ahead. Lee's 
first attempt to advance on Taylor's position was met in 
such fashion that he at once realized the situation and 
urged Banks to wait until proper concentration could be 
had. But Banks sent orders to Franklin to push forward 
his Thirteenth Corps, and ordered Lee to maintain his 
position until it arrived. When Ransom's second brigade 
arrived, he put the two in line, and hearing that Frank- 
lin was coming in person with the advance division 
(Cameron's) of the Thirteenth Corps, he decided to at- 
tack at once in spite of Lee's endeavor to dissuade him. 
But Taylor, having made thoroughly ready, now did the 
attacking himself in such force at all points and with such 
vigor that he swept Banks back with heavy loss and with- 
out check until he reached the woods, where Franklin 
met him at the head of Cameron's division, which had 
double-quickened nearly the entire distance from Bayou 
St. Patrice. There were but fifteen hundred with him, 
and these he put in at once, but they were powerless to 
check the attack. Lee's batteries, unable to fire or ma- 



52 

neuver in the woods, were abandoned by their drivers, 
who took to the trains which vainly endeavored to flee. 
The Confederates reached the rear of Banks' right, and 
the retreat was general. Franklin and Ransom were 
both badly wounded while trying to rally the troops, but 
the retreat was not stayed until it reached Emory's di- 
vision. 

When Franklin started with Cameron's division for 
Sabine Cross Roads he sent back an order to Emory to 
come forward in all haste. As soon as he discovered 
that Banks had gotten the advance guard into an unsup- 
ported fight with Taylor's army, he sent an order back to 
Emory to halt immediately as soon as he could find a 
good defensive position and establish himself. Emory 
reached a stream just in time to form while the retreat 
went by, and here he received the assault so firmly and 
with such a heavy fire that it was repulsed, and could not 
be renewed until the lines were reformed, and it was now 
night. The defeated troops halted in Emory's rear; but 
the position was too precarious for an offensive move- 
ment, and during the night the whole force fell back to 
Pleasant Hill, where it joined A. J. Smith's ten thousand 
on the morning of the 9th. Careful preparation was at 
once made on advantageous ground to receive the re- 
newed assault of Taylor's troops, which did not come 
until four o'clock, and resulted in their complete defeat 
and their retreat. 

Banks no longer felt himself able to pursue his great 
undertaking, and retreat was decided upon. Franklin, 
disabled by his wounds, was unable to exercise any further 
command, though his professional skill and judgment 
were in frequent requisition, and especially in the extrica- 



53 

tion of Porter's fleet from the shallow water of the Red 
River at Alexandria. But for his advice, Bailey's dam 
would probably never have been built. 

Franklin now returned to Washington. While still 
weakened and suffering from his wound he was sum- 
moned to the City Point to confer with Grant, who pro- 
posed to consolidate the four departments of the Susque- 
hanna, Middle, and Western Virginia, and Washington, 
in which Early was already threatening the Capitol, and 
put Franklin in command. His strength did not then 
permit it, and the arrangement was never consummated. 

On his return from this visit, landing early in the 
morning at Baltimore, he found that city in great excite- 
ment in the momentary expectation of an attack by 
Early's troops. It was thought that an early train to 
Philadelphia would have time to pass the danger point 
undisturbed, and General Franklin boarded the train. 
Not far out, however, the train was stopped by a cavalry 
force under the famous Harry Gilmore, and Franklin was 
made a prisoner. That night he managed a shrewd escape, 
and hid himself for two days and nights in woods and 
cornfields, so near the parties searching for him as often 
to overhear their conversation, but unable to move any 
distance because of his wound. Toward the last, from 
pain and weakness and from want of food he became 
delirious. He found his cornfield filled with warriors 
clad in armor and carrying ancient weapons. Although 
fully realizing that he was the victim of illusions, he could 
not dispel his feverish fancies until he grasped their pikes 
and found them cornstalks. He finally reached the house 
of a Union man, who hid and fed him until he could send 
word to General Lew Wallace, then in command at Balti- 



54 

more, who sent out a squadron of cavalry and two regi- 
ments of infantry to escort him to the city. 

LIFE IN HARTFORD. 

In the following autumn General Franklin was as- 
signed to duty as President of the Retiring Board, in 
which capacity he served until he resigned and took up 
his residence in Hartford. 

In 1889 General Franklin was appointed United 
States Commissioner to the Paris Exposition held that 
year. He discharged his duties with singular efficiency. 
The French Government testified its appreciation of his 
services by making him an officer of the Legion of Honor. 

Less conspicuous, perhaps, in the public eye, but of 
great value to the disabled soldiers and to the country 
which cares for them, was the service rendered in the 
management of the National Soldiers' Homes throughout 
the country as president of the board since 1880 until his 
resignation in January, 1900, and for many years its 
treasurer as well ; a work for which he was especially 
fitted by his wise sympathy for the men and his prudence, 
sound judgment, careful economy, and strict and thor- 
oughly intelligent attention to the multitude of details, 
involving the expenditure of many millions. 

The State of Connecticut profited very largely by his 
professional knowledge and skill and his fearless integrity 
in the construction of its present capitol. 

ESTIMATE OF HIS CHARACTER. 

There are men whose influence upon their times and 
whose impress on men's memories come from the un- 



55 

usual development and activity of certain specific but 
limited abilities, or from special traits of character. An 
unusually energetic exhibition of even a moderate amount 
of these may make their possessor strikingly prominent 
under favorable circumstances, the more so perhaps for 
their onesidedness. There are those, again, whose mark 
is made, not by a few strong points of either mind or 
character standing out from the background of an other- 
wise commonplace personality, but by mental powers of 
unusual breadth and force and traits of character of un- 
usual value, and yet all so full rounded and balanced, so 
harmonious in blending and in exercise, so free from de- 
fect in structure and from noise in action, that not until 
by long opportunity men have measured them and their 
work with other standards of being and doing, do their 
strength and beauty stand revealed in full and impressive 
majesty. 

General Franklin was distinctly of this type. Physi- 
cally, intellectually, and spiritually, he was built upon a 
magnificent model. As a scholar of the first order in his 
chosen lines of study, and sympathetic with all intel- 
lectual life and effort, as a man of action, clear in insight 
and in thought, broad and strong in his grasp, certain in 
judgment, definite, direct, prompt and vigorous in action, 
peculiarly diligent in attention to duties of whatever 
magnitude, pure and highminded, with an integrity that 
never left his vision at fault and a courage that never 
hesitated, wise, prudent and strong, simple, kindly, of 
perfect but unconscious dignity, he presented a rare bal- 
ance of great gifts. He graduated from West Point at 
the head of a class remarkable for its membership of men 
who made themselves famous later on. Among those 



56 

intimate with his professional capacity and attainments 
there was never a question that these were of the highest 
grade. He was one of the few men deemed entirely com- 
petent to the highest military command, while his char- 
acter as a man rendered complete the trust reposed in 
him. All his qualities marked him for a great com- 
mander. Added to those already mentioned he had — 
what so few possess — coupled with a perfect sense of 
responsibility, that confidence which is not born of con- 
ceit nor of any undue consciousness of power and often 
goes with the humblest spirit : the confidence that, having 
done all possible to prepare for the issue, one can trust 
his courage and integrity to spend might to the uttermost 
and life itself, and to face defeat unflinching, in its final 
hazard : the calm intelligence that knows when the hour 
of supreme trial has fully come, and the courage that 
rises to its entire responsibility and to take and, if need 
be, suffer all consequences. Less happy in his assign- 
ments to duty than many lesser men, his was often the 
hard honor of saving their wreckages instead of leading 
them to the victories they knew not how to win. Jeal- 
ousy, intrigue, and complaint were each alike impossible 
to him. His great soul was patient and steadfast. His 
patriotism was untouched by any personal considerations. 
And so he took the duties which the ambitions of others 
and the diverse influences of the troubled times left for 
his employment, and went his straightforward way, true 
man, true knight, and true lover of his nation. Few men 
of his time could have contributed more from a military 
point of view to its inner history of influences, measures, 
and actions. It must be always a matter of profound 
regret that he has not left such knowledge behind him. 



57 

So quietly and unostentatiously was all his work 
done that only upon a full and detailed survey can the 
great magnitude of it all, and the great importance of its 
many parts and the invariable high standard of its excel- 
lence, be appreciated. But those who knew the strength 
and uprightness of his mind and character, the kindliness 
of his heart, his noble simplicity and personal dignity, 
his ready devotion to every patriotic interest and duty, 
the loyalty of his nature and the purity and unaffected 
piety of his life, know that one of the bravest of gentle- 
men, one of the purest of patriots, one of the most cher- 
ished of friends, and one of the knightliest of men, has 
answered to his name. 




58 



[Editorial from the Hartford Courant, March 9, 1903.] 

PATRIOT, SOLDIER, AND CHRISTIAN 
GENTLEMAN. 



Hartford bids good-bye to Major-General Franklin 
as she bade good-bye to Rear Admiral Bunce — with 
sorrow, but also with a great pride. The story of his 
services and battles is told in other columns of The 
Courant. Our simpler but harder task here is to say a 
few words about the general himself. There have been 
famous commanders of men who did not look the part. 
William Buel Franklin filled it superbly, to the eye as 
well as to the judgment. West Point had splendid ma- 
terial to work with in his case, and turned out a very not- 
able product. The towering old soldier of two wars re- 
mained a personage in the after time of peace. His was 
one of the presences that dignify the streets of the town 
through which they move, and leave a memory there. 
That form and face, which all Hartford knew, were the 
outward and visible signs of the manliness within — the 
integrity without a stain, the single-hearted, inflexible de- 
votion to duty. His loyalty to his church, to his business 
associates, and to his friends was off the same piece as 
his loyalty to his country. 

He was one of the group of trained soldiers — West 
Pointers — in the war of 1861-65, who fell for a time 



59 

under suspicion, on the part of some vehement editors, 
of being callous to the woes of the slave and skeptical as 
to the military genius of this or the other popular favorite 
of the hour. Some sprinkles of the aspersion that em- 
bittered Fitz John Porter's life for years fell in General 
Franklin's direction, but they did him no permanent 
harm. His soldierly record was as clear as his soldierly 
conscience. There will be nothing but laurel, as pro- 
fusely heaped as nobly earned, for the grave of as true a 
patriot and gentleman as ever breathed American air. 



6o 



The following minute was adopted at a meeting of 
the Rector, Wardens, and Vestry of the Church of the 
Good Shepherd, held on Tuesday evening, March 17, 
1903: 

WILLIAM BUEL FRANKLIN, 1823 — 1903. 



The Rector, Wardens, and Vestry of the Church of 
the Good Shepherd, meeting but a few days after the 
death of General William Buel Franklin, U. S. A., place on 
record a tribute of their affection and esteem for one, who, 
as long as the state of his health allowed, shared the coun- 
sels and responsibilities of their body, and during all the 
years of his residence in Hartford, was a member of the 
parish. For twenty years, from 1870 to 1890, he was 
Senior Warden, and at a later date he was made for the 
rest of his life an honorary vestryman. Others have borne 
testimony to his faithfulness and bravery as a soldier, his 
diligence and success as a student of military science, his 
integrity in business, and his ready and helpful labors for 
the commonwealth; we gladly testify to the simplicity 
and truthfulness of his Christian life, the reality and 
earnestness of his faith, his constant attendance on public 
worship and the Holy Communion, and the readiness 
with which he rendered to the Church, and in particular 
to this parish, every service in his power. We give God 
thanks for his life among us and for his constantly good 
example and pray that our lot may be with his among the 
saints. 



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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



013 700 272 3 



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i l« li4 Mllilll i n i> i a i lil > I U l M l i i ««» i wii ll«i i ili>i<ii i lli Wli^ Il n lll *Laill il MM*illillllim> i U W i i i*« li w»««WHl« 



